Market Observations, Media Matters, and a History Lesson

June 28, 2026

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It has been, by and large, a remarkable week for NASA’s SEWP program, the federal government, and the contractor community that supports them. On Monday, the program announced on its website that awards for the SEWP VI contract had been issued, generating long‑awaited buzz across the govcon ecosystem. Finally, an agency has successfully executed a small‑business‑focused acquisition vehicle through which contract holders and industry can meet mission needs.

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It is fair to say that NITAAC was unable to do the same. They began their process in 2021 (if memory serves), and NIH ultimately decided not to continue it.

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It is also fair to say that GSA has struggled as well. Alliant 2SB, awarded in 2018 after work began around 2016, was canceled in 2019 due to protests. Polaris, its intended replacement, still has not made awards for the Small Business pool. Anyone want to guess why? As a reminder… it is now 2026. That means GSA has had eight to ten years to accomplish what NASA just did—and they haven’t. They rushed out awards for a few pools with low protest risk, hoping to demonstrate capability and competence. It has been a while since you’ve heard from them, hasn’t it?

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Many people feel like SEWP VI has been in motion forever, but NASA’s first RFI was released in 2024. Full awards were made in 2026. They accomplished this with a very small, mission‑oriented civil‑service team; one that delivered what GSA could not, and at a scale GSA has never had to manage.

In 1992, NASA was asked to do things faster and differently than GSA. In 2026, they are still doing exactly that.

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These comparisons may be uncomfortable—but they remain true, nonetheless.

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Market Observations

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NASA’s program announced its awards late Monday afternoon, and the marketplace clearly responded. At least 2,115 companies had reason to celebrate. Many firms posted their wins online, and I’m sure plenty of the consultant‑class were celebrating too; after all, they finally got to send their last invoices to the companies they supported. Congratulations to both groups.

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Other consultants used the moment to advertise their future services. The GAO protests have already been resolved, yet one particularly enterprising group still announced they were available for protest support. That feels a bit late to the party. Not surprising, though—the “protest hustlers” are always circling.

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Then there was the commenter who called SEWP VI a “dumpster fire.” A dumpster fire? Really? Yes, early on the program had a few missteps. But the NASA ITPO team, led by a veteran Program Manager and Contracting Officer, corrected course, stabilized the effort, and brought it home. They completed their mission. NASA delivered in two years (SEWP‑to‑nuts) what the market never received from NITAAC and is still waiting on from GSA. Polaris SB awards, anyone?

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I can forgive opinions formed from ignorance. What I don’t forgive are the opinions coming from people who should know better.

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The Gormley Group

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One announcement I initially found surprising was the one from The Gormley Group. In hindsight, I shouldn’t have been surprised at all.

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I have taken issue with former GSA executive Mr. Bill Gormley for his repeated false accusations about NASA and their SEWP program. For the past 18 months, he, and his colleagues, have been the primary voices in the narrative‑shaping effort aimed at doing what they could not accomplish in the mid‑2000s: removing NASA and their program from the federal acquisition landscape.

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He and his colleagues - former GSA executives Mr. Roger Waldron and Mr. Alan B. Thomas Jr., as well as current GSA Executive and former Coalition President Larry Allen - have, at various points, accused NASA of using SEWP as a “slush fund” (a claim that is not only untrue but patently false). They have repeatedly tried to diminish SEWP by labeling it a “niche” program, implying it is narrow, restrictive, or limited (also untrue, and a deliberate mischaracterization). And they have made absurd claims such as “NASA doesn’t do services and can’t possibly manage them contractually.”

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Their collective disrespect for NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration as a FAR Council agency, and for the leadership of the NASA SEWP program, has been unmistakable. Much of this stems from their mistaken belief that all acquisition programs are the same—that SEWP is simply another version of GSA Schedules.

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This is why you Mr. Thomas say silly things like, “You know, some people believe there should only be one solution for all of government IT because you can get everything on Schedules.” He never identifies who these “some people” are. He just says “some people.” Well, some people are uninformed people if they believe that. It would indicate that some people are dumb people.

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This “SEWP is just like Schedules” mindset appears to be the foundation for The Gormley Group’s sudden interest in advertising SEWP‑related services. Given the founder’s past statements and characterizations, I found that hard to reconcile. A quick look at their website shows expertise in exactly one thing: GSA Schedules consulting.

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This Schedules‑centric worldview is also shared by the Coalition for Federal Procurement (I’m omitting the “Common Sense” portion, as they seem to have done the same). The Coalition functions as a complementary arm of The Gormley Group—they are, in practice, one and the same. Their programming and content reflect this. (* Author’s note: A more accurate name would be “The Coalition for Schedules Contracting,” if they wanted their brand to match their specialization.)

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I don’t have the heart to tell them that NASA and the SEWP Program are not the same as GSA and the Schedules program. Some of them have been at this game for over 30-40 years but still have not figured that out yet. Unlike GSA, there are no satellite interests around SEWP that charge for access, influence, or proximity. Unlike GSA you don't need to have an outside party facilitate a conversation with the program. They have teams of people who actually respond to messages, pick up phones, and answer questions. The former GSA Executives who have made a living on 'access' and 'influence' will be a bit of fish-out-of-water in that respect alone.

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On the Media

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The media environment surrounding NASA’s announcement was also interesting to watch. NASA posted the news on its program website mid‑Monday afternoon, and it clearly made a lot of people happy.

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Within 24 hours, Jason Miller published an article summarizing the program’s accomplishment, the timeline, and included quotes from the program manager. It was a solid piece—worth reading. Jason gave the program the grace it deserved for what it achieved. 

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Not everyone took the same approach.

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Nick Wakeman and Washington Technology published three articles this past week that referenced the program. The first, on the 23rd, presented the basic facts, though with far less depth than Mr. Miller’s reporting. And unlike Mr. Miller, who acknowledged the agency’s path to success, Mr. Wakeman chose to frame the development as another step toward a looming GSA “takeover,” a narrative some have been trying to manifest into reality for years. Mr. Wakeman also didn’t call the program for comment. Had he done so, he might have learned that the departure date of the program manager he mentioned was incorrect.

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The follow‑up article stemmed from an event attended by Ms. Laura Stanton. Ms. Stanton doubled down on her insistence that a takeover is underway, claiming GSA has “embedded” staff at NASA. That word suggests GSA personnel are shoulder‑to‑shoulder with NASA’s team, sleeves rolled up, working hand‑in‑hand. That is not the case. Yes, GSA has staff present, but they have no more understanding today of what it takes to manage, operate, and run NASA’s gold‑standard GWAC than they did 15 months ago.

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The article also quoted Ms. Stanton saying she wants to “maintain continuity” and “handle with care.” That sounds reassuring. Yet NASA was surprised to learn that they supposedly no longer have an “executive agency designation.” If that were true, NASA would have just awarded a contract without OMB authority, rendering all 2,115 awards null and void. Fortunately, Wakeman was incorrect. NASA’s authority to award and manage SEWP VI has not been rescinded by OFPP. But accuracy was not the point of the article; advancing a narrative was.

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A third article covered more of Ms. Stanton’s remarks. She echoed the same talking points pushed by GSA‑aligned interests, tying them to the administration’s desire to “dial back” the federal footprint of certain agencies. Mr. Wakeman initially framed this as a “history lesson,” invoking the Hoover Commission as justification for consolidation. Yes, GSA was created by the Hoover Commission, which consolidated a hodgepodge of executive functions. That part is true.

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But the other truth is now also out there. Wakeman correctly noted that “GSA wants to consolidate… through its vehicles.” This is not about what President Trump or Vice President Vance wants.  They didn’t ask for this. It is not about what Director Vought or Dr. Rhodes wants. It is about what GSA - and its former executives - want: control over the federal government’s market mechanisms.

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Ms. Stanton could have taken a different approach, giving NASA the space and grace to celebrate the accomplishment. For example, she could have said something like:

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“Did you see what NASA accomplished? They did something we haven’t been able to do. They do what we do—but better. The standard they set is one the rest of our portfolio would have to meet. That’s why we want to learn from them. People think we’ll change NASA’s program, but really, we’re looking to NASA to change us.”

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That would have been a wonderful and respectful response. It would have acknowledged NASA as an agency and SEWP as a program, while still leaving the door open for consolidation. Instead, GSA did what it always does - made news about another agency about themselves. NASA announces on Monday, and immediately GSA shifts attention away from NASA’s success and toward its own institutional ambitions.

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What Ms. Stanton, the GSA Schedule‑based interests, and Mr. Wakeman neglected to mention is what has happened since 1948. Because GSA could not fulfill its management and oversight responsibilities within the Executive Branch, OMB and OFPP were created. Because GSA’s Supply Schedules were too inflexible, NASA was asked in 1992 to become involved.

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Those are the lessons of history, not 'histrionics' for the purpose of narrative control. They are lessons that NASA and OFPP will consider when deciding whether GSA has demonstrated the capability needed to assume NASA’s program. GSA Schedule‑aligned interests can draft an Executive Order they believe grants them that authority, but ultimately it will be NASA, OFPP, and OMB to determine whether GSA has earned it.

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GSA wants to dial things back to 1948. The rest of government says, “How about you guys just settle for 1992?” knowing that GSA is not in any position, whatsoever, to steward NASA's model or manage this free marketplace.

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NASA knows it.

OFPP knows it.

OMB knows it.

The federal agencies know it.

The contract holders who work with both agencies know it.

The OEMs and providers also know it.

Hell, if they admitted it to themselves, even GSA knows it.

So now we all know.

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                                                                                                                                                                           ~ J. Johnson