Institutional Capture and a Coalition of Self-Interests

(*This article was published on LinkedIn June 13, 2025.)

The Coalition's Trojan Horse

Sometimes when you see something you cannot unsee it.  Sometimes it takes time to understand what you are seeing, and once you do you can then look back to make sense of it.  Let me help the GovCon community make sense of what they are seeing right now concerning contract consolidation.  Once you do, you can now make a better sense of what is happening.  But before I do, let’s begin with a question.

 What is ‘Institutional Capture’ in Public Administration? 

This refers to situations where public institutions—such as regulatory bodies, government agencies, or public offices—are dominated or unduly influenced by private interests, political actors, or internal stakeholders in ways that compromise their ability to serve the public interest effectively.    It is the process by which external or internal actors—such as corporations, political elites, or bureaucrats—exert undue influence over a public institution’s decision-making, priorities, or operations, causing it to act in favor of specific interests rather than the general public good.

Characteristics of an organization institutionally captured may include:

· Deviated Mandate: The institution deviates from its original public service mandate due to the influence of vested interests.

· Impaired Autonomy: Institutional decisions are no longer made independently or based on objective policy analysis but are shaped by the preferences of powerful actors.

· Loss of Legitimacy: Public trust in the institution erodes as it is perceived to serve select groups rather than the public.

· Systemic and Enduring: Unlike individual corruption, institutional capture tends to be systemic and entrenched, often persisting over time.

Institutional capture can take on a few forms, including:

· Regulatory Capture: A specific type where regulatory agencies are influenced by the industries they are supposed to regulate (e.g., energy, banking, telecommunications).

· Political Capture: When political elites manipulate public institutions to serve partisan or electoral interests.

· Bureaucratic Capture: When bureaucrats prioritize their own power, job security, or agendas over public service goals.

· Judicial Capture: When courts are influenced by political or economic elites, undermining judicial independence.

Lastly, the consequences of Institutional Capture can include:

·         Reduced accountability

·         Poor service delivery

·         Policy distortion

·         Corruption and rent-seeking

·         Weak rule of law

·         Loss of public trust

 Institutional Capture and the General Services Administration

If there was Institutional Capture at the General Services Administration, what would it look like?  What would be some of the evidence or effects of such a condition be?  It would likely be subtle but highly impactful.  Evidence, signs, and causes of institutional capture would be:

1. Procurement Favoritism

• Signs: Contracts repeatedly awarded to a narrow group of vendors despite questionable value proposition or higher costs.

• Cause: Influence from politically connected contractors, lobbyists, or the influence of former executives leading to biased processes.

2. Policy or Rulemaking Favoring Certain Firms

• Signs: Procurement policies, standards, or frameworks appear tailored to the capabilities or needs of a specific company or industry group.

• Cause: Close relationships between government officials and private sector actors lobbying for favorable terms.

3. Revolving Door

• Signs: High-level government officials moving into positions at firms doing business with GSA, associations through which to consult, and vise versa variations between the three.

• Cause: Institutionalized networks of mutual benefit between the agency, regulators and regulated entities.

4. Suppressed Internal Dissent

• Signs: Whistleblowers or internal auditors reporting retaliation or being ignored when raising concerns about contracting irregularities or favoritism.

• Cause: Internal efforts to protect compromised relationships or avoid scrutiny.

5. Reduced Oversight or Auditing

• Signs: A noticeable decline in internal audits, delayed inspector general reports, or selective enforcement of procurement rules.

• Cause: Efforts to shield influential stakeholders or avoid exposing inefficiencies.

If this were the case what would the effects be?

Distorted Procurement Outcomes

• Government’s role in ensuring cost-effective, competitive procurement is compromised.

• Taxpayer money may be wasted on overpriced or low-quality services and goods.

Erosion of Public Trust

• Public confidence in the federal government’s ability to manage public resources fairly diminishes.

Unfair Competitive Landscape

• Smaller or newer vendors are crowded out, reinforcing the dominance of well-connected incumbents.

• Innovation and cost-saving are stifled.

Policy Ineffectiveness

• Federal property management, administration goals, or tech modernization efforts may falter if driven by private interests rather than a stated need.

Undermined Accountability

• Oversight bodies (e.g., inspectors general) may be neutralized or disincentivized from exposing wrongdoing, creating a culture of impunity.

As to whether evidence of Institutional Capture exists, I will leave it to you (and the public record) to make your own determinations.  I just find things...coincidental.  Consolidation orders that strip OMB’s authority at determining executive agents for IT contracts, and then later saying “Nothing should be construed to impair or otherwise affect the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget” is a clear grab that would indicate the execution of policy capture by interests.  I also find it interesting that they close with “This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.”  Though the Executive Office of the President may not intend this to be the case, institutional capture related to the General Services Administration and the consolidation initiative may make this an inevitability.

 A Schedules-Based View of the World

One could read what is written above to think that the institutional capture I describe is a by-product of the self-interests typical of the swamp-like stereotypes most of the country (and a good part of the DC area) have concerning how things work in DC; the exact conditions that elevated President Trump to the White House a second time.

The best leaders I know say “Jon…begin with the assumption of good intent”, so with that being said…

I will be the first to admit that it may not necessarily be the (complete) case.  They may not be indications of ‘the swamp’ but rather a group of individuals conditioned to holding a particular belief – that all the government needs is centralization of acquisitions under the agency and a GSA’s Schedules program to satisfy government’s IT needs.  After all, this was the program that formed the basis of the General Services Administration in 1949 (inheriting it from the Treasury Department who held that responsibility prior to the Bureau of General Services which was established in 1947).  It is the program that forms the basis of their internal policies and procedures, has for a long time, and shaped their view as to how government-wide federal acquisitions should function.  It is the internally and externally expressed mentality of those involved in what is happening now. 

The problem with this as a mental anchor is how it shapes perceptions (misconceptions) of how IT is bought.  It stems from the original paper process of the 1950’s when government would buy through retail print catalogs (think the old JC Penny catalogs or today BestBuy/Walmart), which was the norm up until the mid-late 1990’s.  They want ‘fixed’ prices for people who then shop.  It makes a lot of sense when you are buying a computer or software for your home use or startup small business…the problem is that this is not how an enterprise buys, deploys, or manages their IT…as if contracting lead at Citibank is thumbing through leaflets (or the website) of Best Buy, Office Depot, or Walmart for their enterprise agreement concerning Dell (or Microsoft, or Adobe, or Cisco, or Oracle).

This is the current rendition of category management – manage categories as if you were a retail store and people are shopping through your leaflets or walking through aisles…physically or virtually.  However, when it comes to IT, this is not the way enterprises engage in an exchange for their technology and support needs.  Enterprises don’t shop…they do their homework, define their needs & requirements, procure, and secure.

There has been a change in tone recently, although I find it odd.  The people pushing it forward, the people responsible for the institutional capture of the organization, are now saying that if they are mistaken about how business works, then the private sector should tell them.  Let me make another suggestion…

The people that suggested and moved this forward as an initiative for the Trump Administration should know how enterprise business works.  Seeing how they are the (ahem) experts within the Coalition of Self-Interest, the original Architects of Inefficiency, they should know how the policy initiatives they propose can be accomplished. 

“Jon…begin with the assumption of good intent” –

“I am sorry.  I cannot help but see what I do.  I see a purposeful intent that is good, but only for those who benefit from the Institutional Capture they have been able to successfully orchestrate and leverage.  It is going to be good for them.  Good for the former GSA executives.  Good for their clients.  Good for the consulting class that circles that agency and their programs.” 

There is no such circle of influence around NASA’s program.  NASA’s program works so well it is not required. 

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What will the likely outcome be? 

Typical outcomes of agencies who are subject to Institutional Capture:

1. Financial Losses

2. Erosion of Public Trust

3. Reduced Competitive Fairness

This should underscore the need for comprehensive reforms within the GSA, and I believe the Trump Administration, the Executive Office of the President, and the Office of Management and Budget are perfectly positioned to help address this condition of Institutional Capture that GSA finds itself in.  Doing so, and having the agency focus on executing their newly assigned functions, phasing out the other GWACs once NASA completes their awards for their SEWP VI program, and reforming their business processes, systems, and rules to reform their Schedules program once again.

Schedules has always been akin to the “fishing license” for industry to contract with the federal government.  It may be time for OMB to consider that GSA get out of the fishing license business entirely and instead start from scratch.  Keep NASA’s program untouched by GSA’s influence and extend Cooperative Purchasing so state and local governments can also enjoy the benefits and fruits of NASA’s contributions to the field of IT acquisitions, which have proven efficient, effective and successful over the past 30 years at the Federal level. 

Don’t allow the Architects of Inefficiency or the Coalition of Self-Interests institutionally capture NASA’s program that has proven to be a valuable function for mission-driven agencies.