On GWAC Consolidation

(*This article was posted on LinkedIn on April 2, 2025.)

The past two weeks have been quite eventful as the government and industry continue to grasp the implications and activities that affect this space.  The rumor mill runs rampant among government personnel and contract holders, and people have been reaching out asking me about the implications of GWAC consolidation.

Emily W. Murphy, former GSA Administrator under President Trump’s first Administration, and Terry Gerton (Edited for correction. Initially noted Thomas Temin) discussed the current conditions at the General Services Administration, and they did a great job of characterizing the tremendous challenges.  It is a tall order.  GSA must become a buying agency again for some agencies, and around some assets, for the government again. They also need to strip the Federal Aquisition Regulations to their legislative essentials, and they also have to figure out the issues of contract duplication.

Contract duplication is an interesting phenomenon. Emily notes that in the Bush Administration there were concerns at GSA who argued that NASA and NIH vehicles were “competition with the schedules program”, but the effort to close those vehicles failed.  So, what did GSA do instead?  They started duplicating contracts.  GWAC and vehicle proliferation started at GSA only after they couldn’t “kill” their competition in 2006.

This duplication, however, didn’t stop there.  They viewed the “Schedules BPA” as another mechanism.  Those proliferated as well, particularly during my time at that agency.  This was the “answer” to any problem posed.  I know because this was the mechanism I was told to utilize when solving market needs.  BPA for Cloud Infrastructure.  BPA for Cloud Email Services.  BPA for Telecommunications Expense Management.  BPA for Wireless Telecommunications.  I wrote or worked on them all…after all that was our job at GSA; create contract mechanisms for government use.  All of which created more costs for industry and contract holders as they had to respond accordingly.

Today the agency now finds itself in a position to have to do something about GWAC and contract duplication.  Which do we now eliminate?  Which do we consolidate? One could say that the GSA have been trying to eliminate NASA’s program since 2006.  Those conversations are about to be had again, the results of those conversations are going to be interesting.  After all, GSA perpetuated the conditions of contract duplication and now must make decisions as to which to cut, eliminate, and consolidate.  Will this FINALLY be their opportunity to “take” from NASA what they always coveted?

I would not be so sure.  GSA is going to have to do some serious reflection on how they will be able to measure up.  NASA has done the job asked of them.  They were asked to apply innovations to help expedite the point of exchange between government and industry, and in doing so created the most efficient and effective mechanisms in government contracting by all accounts and measures.  NASA relies on it, and, since it is used by every single federal agency despite no mandate to do so, it is safe to say agencies involved in national security, defense, or veterans’ health rely on it as well.

Program Comparison

Comparison Reference

Before our friends at the GSA begin measuring NASA’s drapes and saying that the program is now under new management, they may want to take Emily’s advice and instead talk to people.  Actually…better take mine and instead … listen.  You always learn more when you listen. 

If you listen to the people in government, you will hear that this is the fastest mechanism known to execute contract actions at the speed of mission and can get what they want rapidly.  If new technology or service is sought it can be available in less than 24 hours.  You will also hear that agencies use their data to manage their operations.  It is accurate, complete, and available for them to use to help manage.

If you listen, you will hear industry say that NASA makes things easy for them.  Easy to add products and services, easy for agencies to use (which contract holders like).  It is fast, automated, and works at the speed of their business.  They can service agency mission needs faster through SEWP than any other vehicle.  And they do the little things with more efficiency and intelligence.  The program is just smart.  You will hear why many use it as their preferred (and in some cases exclusive) mechanism to transact in government.  They will always conduct business however the government wants to, but this is their first choice and there are many reasons why. 

If you listen, you will also hear how the program has been doing services throughout the current iteration of the program.  33% of the orders are product-oriented service related.  Federal agencies have used NASA’s program to procure $26B in service contracts over the current iteration of their vehicle.  Of that about $7B were pure service contracts and the remainder were under the maintenance agreements which are also service contracts.

What the 6th version of this successful vehicle introduces are contract types that were not available under the previous version.  NASA as an organization made the determination that they wanted this availability since they are the requirements owner of that vehicle, constructed in concert with the objective of meeting the agency's, and the governments', mission needs.  Though supporting new contract types is a new feature, I am sure that NASA has the capabilities of figuring it out.  It, after all, isn’t rocket science.

I really appreciated Ms. Murphy’s insights, and the prospects are thrilling.  The last concentrated effort at these kinds of needed reforms was Clinger-Cohen.   The thinning of the FAR is exciting for everybody, and the efficiency focus is a core principle of public administration (read Herbert Simon).  That being said, I personally remain suspicious of a legacy mindset held by some at GSA.  People in that sphere have contributed to the proliferation of government-wide contracts while holding resentment at not having the entire pie. Meanwhile, NASA just quietly executed the efficiencies that GSA only speaks of or aspired towards. 

It took a rocket scientist to construct the mechanism I described above.  GSA personnel had over 30 years to learn from them.  They have not yet.  Imagine what you would have learned by now if you did?